The announcement by Awami League President Sheikh Hasina that she intends to return to Bangladesh has generated not only political excitement and curiosity within the country but also considerable international attention. Speculation is mounting over what may unfold in Bangladesh this coming December. Will Sheikh Hasina face execution upon her return? Or could she encounter a new threat to her life? Let us examine the issue more closely. A Bangladeshi court has sentenced Sheikh Hasina to death through what critics describe as a rushed "kangaroo court" trial on charges of crimes against humanity. But what exactly are the foundations of this verdict and the allegations against her? According to a report by the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR), the death toll during the 2024 student-led protests may have reached as high as 1,400. By contrast, preliminary figures released by the Office of the Chief Adviser and the Ministry of Health under the interim government led by Dr. Muhammad Yunus placed the number between 631 and 844. Another issue has also sparked debate. Several individuals who had been listed as killed or martyred during the July–August movement were later found to be alive. Evidence has emerged suggesting that misinformation, mistaken identification by relatives, and even attempts by dishonest individuals to secure financial benefits resulted in some names being wrongly included on the list of martyrs. The government has stated that anyone found to have been falsely listed will be removed from the July Shaheed Smrity Foundation records and official gazette. At the time of writing, district administrations and special verification cells are still reviewing the information to establish an accurate list of genuine martyrs. This raises an important question: why have the reported figures varied so dramatically over time? Psychology and criminology suggest that genuine memories are easier to recall, whereas fabricated narratives impose a greater cognitive burden on the brain. Since invented stories require continuous mental reconstruction, it becomes difficult to reproduce the exact same version repeatedly. The inconsistencies surrounding the reported death toll of the July–August movement could therefore be described, in criminological terms, as an example of "cognitive load." Recent media reports indicate that remarks made by individuals such as Sajib Bhuiyan, Nahid Akter, and Asif Nazrul have been both suggestive and alarming. These are among the same figures who previously claimed that, had the July–August movement failed, they were "prepared for an armed revolution." According to a source with close ties to the intelligence community—one that reportedly warned in advance about the Holey Artisan attack—there are concerns that if Sheikh Hasina returns to Bangladesh, extremist groups allegedly backed by Dr. Yunus and working alongside Pakistani militants may attempt to accomplish what they failed to do after entering Ganabhaban on 5 August 2024. Before attempting to predict what might happen if Sheikh Hasina returns, it is worth revisiting her political history. Two of her homecomings are regarded as among the most significant and high-risk moments in Bangladesh's political history. The first (17 May 1981): After the assassination of Bangabandhu Sheikh Mujibur Rahman and most of his family members on 15 August 1975, Sheikh Hasina spent nearly six years in exile before returning to Bangladesh. With the country then under military rule, serious concerns surrounded her safety. Nevertheless, ignoring all fears, she landed at Dhaka's Kurmitola Airport on 17 May 1981, where an estimated 1.5 million people gathered to welcome her. The massive crowd stretched from the airport all the way to Farmgate. The second (7 May 2007): During the military-backed caretaker government, Sheikh Hasina returned despite immense political uncertainty and personal risk. The caretaker administration had attempted to prevent her return by imposing restrictions and instructing airlines not to issue her boarding passes. Yet she overcame every obstacle and landed at Dhaka Airport (then Zia International Airport), where hundreds of thousands of supporters welcomed her. Alarmed by the overwhelming public response, the caretaker government later arrested her on 16 July 2007. The current situation inevitably recalls the assassination of former Pakistani Prime Minister Benazir Bhutto. Although no conclusive evidence ever proved the direct involvement of senior leaders of her Pakistan Peoples Party (PPP), political conspiracy theories have long suggested that certain individuals within the party may have benefited indirectly. Investigative reports also raised questions about the suspicious conduct and negligence of some members of her own security team. After nearly nine years in exile, Benazir returned to Pakistan on 18 October 2007. Just 70 days later, on 27 December, she was assassinated in Rawalpindi during an election rally in a combined gun and suicide bomb attack. Serious allegations later emerged that local authorities and certain insiders quickly washed down the crime scene at Liaquat Bagh, destroying crucial evidence. Bangladesh witnessed a similar pattern. On the afternoon of 16 February 1999, Jatiya Samajtantrik Dal (JSD) President Kazi Aref Ahmed and four other JSD leaders were shot dead by terrorists during an anti-terrorism rally at Kalidaspur Government Primary School in Ariya Union, Daulatpur Upazila, Kushtia. The killings shocked the nation. According to a reliable source, four ideologically diverse groups were separately involved in the operation: the Purba Banglar Communist Party, a small faction of the JSD, a local BNP leader, and several anti-liberation police officers who had remained within the administration. One group allegedly supplied professional killers, another provided the weapons, another secured escape routes, while a fourth delayed police intervention in exchange for large sums of money. Remarkably, these groups reportedly had no direct contact with one another and held no joint meetings; the entire operation was coordinated through handwritten notes, or chirikuts. According to the confession of death-row convict Jhontu, a secret meeting took place approximately two weeks before the attack at a house in Atharokhada village, Chuadanga. Several individuals, including Lantu (the alleged ringleader) and Mannan Molla, attended the meeting. Acting on its decisions, two members of the Laltu group handed Jhontu a handwritten note that simply instructed: "Go with the bearer of this note and carry out a small operation." Immediately after the killings, intervention from the Prime Minister's Office reportedly led to the arrest of a JSD leader and a local union chairman present at the scene, who later became a state witness. According to his testimony, every aspect of the operation—from obtaining the weapons to determining who would be killed after whose speech—was communicated through separate handwritten notes. Even payments intended to keep the local police inactive were allegedly arranged through these notes. In other words, a series of discreet messages and large financial transactions were allegedly used to weaken one of the key organizers of Bangladesh's Liberation War. Kazi Aref Ahmed was known to be one of Sheikh Hasina's closest political allies, and weakening her politically was said to have been the primary objective behind the assassination. In today's digital age, the handwritten notes of the 1990s could easily be replaced by the internet, email, SMS, Viber, or WhatsApp—as illustrated by later extremist incidents such as the Holey Artisan attack. If Sheikh Hasina returns to Bangladesh this December, no one can guarantee that events similar to the assassinations of Benazir Bhutto or Kazi Aref Ahmed will not recur, or that a modern sniper attack orchestrated by individuals hidden within the Awami League itself will never take place in exchange for substantial sums of money. It is worth noting that some individuals convicted in the Kazi Aref Ahmed murder case later joined the Awami League. Therefore, there is no alternative but to exercise caution and develop a comprehensive, forward-looking security strategy to prevent any unforeseen situation. One thing, however, remains beyond doubt: Sheikh Hasina intends to return.

Author: Niharika Roy, Political Analyst and Columnist.